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ABSTRACT 
This article critically examines the judicial applications of the EU functionality 
doctrine and argues that recent CJEU decisions are at odds with the EU legislator’s 
declared intention to give functionality a much greater role in promoting product 
market competition.  As a statutory ground for refusing registration even in the 
presence of consumer association and established goodwill, EU functionality serves to 
avoid undue competitive advantages by refusing protection in support of freedom to 
compete.  EU functionality represents a significant obstacle to registration for purely 
natural, technical and value adding signs representing the shape of the goods.  As of 
2015, the wording now includes not only the shape but also another product 
“characteristic” such as colour, sounds, scents, texture, etc.  Thus, these tripartite 
criteria underpinning EU functionality are likely to affect the registration of 
unconventional marks or product trade dress brands.  This article undertakes a 
deeper examination into each of these non-functionality criteria, highlighting 
problematic interpretations and suggesting ways to improve existing practice.  
Unlike existing narratives, this article places the competition goals of EU trade mark 
law at the centre of the debate and within a much broader context beyond functional 
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LOUBOUTIN HEELS AND THE COMPETITION GOALS OF EU TRADE MARK 
LAW 
CESAR J. RAMIREZ-MONTES* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article begins with a tricky question.  What does the recent high-profile 
litigation involving the red sole of Louboutin shoes1 have in common with other 
disputes involving the shape of the Philips three-headed rotary shaver,2 the Lego toy 
brick,3 the Bang & Olufsen pencil-shaped loudspeaker,4 the G-star Elwood jeans,5 the 
Yoshidine knife,6 the Rubik’s cube,7 the Kit-Kat four-fingered chocolate biscuit,8 the 
Tripp-Trapp children’s chair,9 the London taxi cab,10 the Lego manikins,11 and the 
gold and pink bottles of Bottega Gold’s sparkling wines?12  They all involved 
registered trade marks, the validity of which was challenged on the basis that they 
were utilitarian designs.  Where the validity claims succeeded, the registration rights 
immediately ended notwithstanding strong public association and significant 
reputation owing to their proprietors’ long-standing investments.  In those successful 
instances, the effect was to permit defendant companies to freely market identical or 
very similar products that were in direct competition with the brand owner, which 
may arguably cause confusion.  What may seem even more striking is that protecting 
brand owners against unfair competition and preventing consumer confusion 
crucially underpin EU trade mark law.13  What then was the ground upon which 
some of these famous registrations were lost?  That ground was the EU trade mark 
functionality criteria under ex-Art.3(1)(e) (now Art.4(1)(e) recast) Trade Marks 
Directive (TMD)14 and Art.7(1)(e) Community Trade Marks Regulation (as amended 
 
*© Cesar J. Ramirez-Montes 2019.  Intellectual Property Lecturer, Leeds University. Many 
thanks to all participants at the WIPs Lunch hosted by University College London in February 
2019.  
1 Case C-163/16, Christian Louboutin v. Van Haren Shoenen BV, 2018 E.C.R. I-423. 
2 Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd, 
2002 E.C.R. I-377. 
3 Case C-48/09, Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516. 
4 Case T-508/08, Bang & Olufsen A/S v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. II-06975. 
5 Case C-371/06, Benetton Group SpA v. G-Star Int BV, 2007 E.C.R. I-542. 
6 Case C-421/15, Yoshida Metal Industry Co v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-360; Cases C-337/12 to C-
340/12, Pi-Design AG v. Yoshida Metal Industry Co, 2014 E.C.R. I-129. 
7 Case C-30/15, Simba Toys v. Seven Towns, 2016 E.C.R. I-849. 
8 Case C-215/14, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK, 2015 E.C.R. I-604. 
9 Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233. 
10 The London Taxi Co v. Frazer-Nash Research Ltd [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1729 (Eng.). 
11 Case C-452/15, Best-Lock (Europe) v. Lego Juris A/S, 2016 E.C.R. I-270. 
12 Case T-324/18 and Case T-325/18, Vinicola Tombacco (VI.TO.) Srl v. EUIPO, 2019 E.C.R. II-
297, 2019 E.C.R. II-299. 
13 Cesar Ramirez-Montes, A Re-Examination of the Original Foundations of Anglo-American 
Trademark Law, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 91 (2010).  
14 Directive 2015/2436, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to 
Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks (Recast), 2015 O.J. (L 336) 
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by European Trade Mark Regulation 2015/2424 or ETMR15).  Functionality assumes 
that certain shapes or product features are so important for the absolute freedom of 
all traders to compete that they must remain in the public domain and 
unencumbered by exclusive rights.  When that is the case, functionality represents 
an insurmountable obstacle to registration as functional marks are prevented by law 
ever fulfilling the general requirement of indicating a commercial source to 
consumers or, if registration exists, acts as a ground for invalidating the registration 
even if proving that extensive market use has resulted in the functional mark 
successfully acquiring source significance.  EU functionality serves to avoid undue 
competitive advantages by refusing protection in support of freedom to compete.  The 
greater public interest in enhancing product competition overrides the public interest 
in preserving reputation and avoiding consumer confusion.  Examining functionality 
matters, and European scholars are increasingly paying close attention to the 
doctrine.16  The limits of the functionality doctrine are therefore of great interest to 
brand owners across markets but its normative content and appropriate scope has 
much wider implications for society and the public, and this article examines each 
functionality criterion in order to challenge problematic interpretations and 
assumptions with a view to making a contribution to the field but going beyond 
ongoing debates in calling for a change in the way EU functionality is developing.  
This article argues that the European functionality doctrine is currently at a 
crossroads, and some would point out that recent decisions have left it in “an 
unfortunate conundrum.”17  On the one hand, the 2015 legislative reforms have 
resulted in the expansion of the statutory criteria for permanently refusing (or 
invalidating) the registration of product trade dress brands on functionality grounds.  
According to Art.4(1)(e) TMD and Art.7(1)(e) EUTMR, functional signs are excluded 
if they consist exclusively of the shape or “another characteristic” which results from 
the nature of the goods (natural signs), are necessary to achieve a technical result 
(technical signs), or give substantial value to the goods (ornamental signs).  These 
non-functional registration requirements operate independently of each other and 
together form the EU “functionality” doctrine.  Prior to 2015, (ex-)Art.3(1)(e)TMD18 
and Art.7(1)(e) CTMR19 referred solely to functionality in terms of “the shape of 
 
1, 7.  The (recast) Directive entered into force on January 12, 2016, and Member States had three 
years (deadline of January 14th, 2019) to transpose it into national law. 
15 Regulation 2015/2424, 2015 O.J. (L 341) 21, 28 (EU). The new EUTMR came into force on 23rd 
March 2016 but certain provisions which require implementing legislation will enter into force on 
October 1st, 2017.  See also, Regulation 2017/1001, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 June 2017 on the European Union Trade Mark, 2017 O.J. (L 154) 1, 8 (EU). 
16 Maeve Lynch, Product Configuration Marks: The Shape of Things to Come, 12 J. INTELL. 
PROP. LAW & PRAC. 465, 465 (2017); Apostolos Chronopoulos, De Jure Functionality of Shapes 
Driven by Technical Considerations in Manufacturing Methods 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 286, 286 (2017); 
Gabriele Engels & Claire Lehr, Sweets, Cars and Bottles - Three Dimensional Trade Marks?, 12 J. 
INTELL. PROP. LAW & PRAC. 797 (2017); Antoon Quaedvlieg, Shapes with a Technical Function: An 
Ever-Expanding Exclusion?, 1 ERA FORUM 101, 101 (2016). 
17 Lavinia Brancusi, Trade Marks’ Functionality in EU Law: Expected New Trends After the 
Louboutin Case, 2 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 98, 105 (2019). 
18 Directive 2008/95/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to 
Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25, 26. 
19 Council Regulation 207/2009 of 26 February 2009, on the Community Trade Mark, 2009 O.J. 
(L 78) 1, 3 (EU). 
[19:38 2019] UIC Review of Intellectual Property 40 
 
goods.” Non-shape functionality cases were not included.  Given the enlargement of 
the universe of registrable marks under the 2015 reforms, the EU legislature 
considered it appropriate to enable functionality to have a much greater role in the 
exclusion of product features that, whilst being source-identifiers in the eyes of 
consumers, may nevertheless cause serious distortions of competition.  On the other 
hand, recent Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) decisions interpreting (ex-)Art.3(1)(e) 
TMD appear to run counter to the clear legislative intent to expand rather than 
restrict the scope of functionality.  Whilst the CJEU appears to take a teleological 
approach (looking beyond the literal wording) to the normative content of the 
undefined functionality criteria, it takes a more formalistic (restricted to the literal 
wording) viewpoint of the category of marks that may be subject to a functionality 
examination.  The recent Louboutin opinion illustrates this formalistic view insofar 
as the Court concluded that Louboutin’s red colour mark for the outer sole of high-
heeled shoes cannot constitute exclusively a “shape” within the meaning of (ex-
)Art.3(1)(e).20  Since non-shape mark cases cannot formally fall within this provision, 
the CJEU’s narrow interpretation automatically excludes a competition enquiry into 
the ability of rivals to meet consumer demand for equally competing products in the 
women’s shoes market on the potential ground that the Louboutin mark adds 
substantial value to the goods (or is aesthetically functional in US law).   
More recently, the CJEU affirmed its restrictive Louboutin interpretation of 
“shape” by excluding the revocation of a registered decorative pattern mark on 
functionality grounds notwithstanding the existence of copyright protection for the 
pattern as an artistic copyright work.21  These are not however isolated instances of a 
formalistic approach to the statutory functionality criteria.  In Apple, the Court 
excluded a functionality analysis of a 3D representation of a store design for retail 
service mark because (ex-)Art.3(1)(e) explicitly refers to the shape of goods, not 
services.22  Despite the wider implications of allowing registration of store designs as 
trade marks, the effect of Apple is to leave the examination of any competition 
concerns within distinctiveness assessments even though this a flexible barrier that 
evidence of consumer acceptance (or secondary meaning) may easily overcome.23  The 
formalistic view that the statutory wording concerns only the shape of “goods” (not 
the shape of “services”) seems counter-intuitive and unconvincing, particularly in the 
light of the Court’s own case-law according to which European law “must not be 
interpreted solely on the basis of its wording but also in the light of the overall 
scheme and objectives of the system of which it is a part.”24  In other rulings, the 
CJEU has consistently stated that the overwhelming aim of the functionality 
exclusions concerns the problem of anti-competitive protection rather than 
cumulation of rights per se.25  However, if the overriding aim of European 
functionality is to avoid distortions of competition arising from permanent trade 
mark exclusivity, it is hard to see why the exclusion of aesthetically ornamental 
 
20 Case C-163/16, Christian Louboutin v. Van Haren Shoenen BV, 2018 E.C.R. I-423. 
21 Case C-21/18, Textilis Ltd v. Sveskt Tenn AB, 2019 E.C.R. I-199. 
22 Case C-421/13, Apple Inc. v. Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt, 2014 E.C.R. I-2070 (¶ 24). 
23 Cesar J. Ramirez-Montes, Trade Marking the Look and Feel of Business Environments in 
Europe, 25 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 75 (2019). 
24 Case C-292/00, Davidoff & Cie SA v. Godkit Ltd, 2003 E.C.R. I-9 (¶ 24); Case C-408/81, 
Adidas-Salomon AG v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd, 2003 E.C.R. I-582 (¶¶ 19-20). 
25 See infra II.A. (“The Ration Legis of the European Functionality Criteria”).   
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shapes has no application to a decorative pattern mark or a trade dress mark for 
retail services.  Moreover, commentators seem to exacerbate this bewildering state of 
affairs in their criticisms that the CJEU’s decisions have starkly expanded the ambit 
of functionality to address competitors’ interests at the expense of reduced 
transparency and legal certainty.26  In fact, given the unprecedented expansions of 
the definition of a trade mark, it is puzzling to see only the partial expansion of 
grounds for refusing registration or the creation of defenses to permit relevant uses 
in the interest of competition or other expressive uses.27  Functionality therefore 
deserves closer attention and this article critically examines its judicial applications 
in the case-law, highlighting shortcomings and suggesting ways to improve current 
practice.  
This article re-examines the (unsettled) boundaries of the European 
functionality by reviewing the relevant case-law and the literature, but it goes 
beyond existing narratives in placing the competition goals of EU trade mark law 
within a broader context which includes both distinctiveness evaluations and 
functionality.  Commentary usually focusses on the functionality provision without 
considering the law’s wider function of promoting market competition that is 
inherent in the other grounds for refusing registration.28  Furthermore, this paper is 
ambitious in promoting a more rigorous academic debate around the growing 
importance of competition-based considerations in EU trade mark law and in offering 
arguments for adopting a more consistent policy that enhances, rather than limits 
the reach of functionality.  Accordingly, Part I identifies unrestrained product 
competition as the leitmotif in EU trade mark functionality and then goes on to 
discuss tactical behavior in the classification of marks that may be subject to a 
functionality examination as a way to escape a functionality attack.  This is then 
contrasted with the over-inclusive approach to categories of marks that fall within 
the strict analytical criterion for predicting consumer reaction to shapes or any other 
unconventional mark as source-identifiers (also known as ‘distinctiveness 
evaluation’).  Part II then turns to each of the functionality criteria, highlighting 
shortcomings in the case-law and making the case for a much broader view of 
technical functionality. It also challenges some suggestions in the literature, 
particularly regarding the problematic criterion excluding functional features that 
add substantial value to the goods.  Part III finally challenges recent suggestions 
about the way the value-adding criterion should be interpreted and draws upon US 
scholarship to argue for a more nuanced approach to this criterion. 
 
26 ANNETTE KUR & MARTIN SEFTLEBEN, EUROPEAN TRADE MARK LAW, A COMMENTARY 152 
(2017).  Cf Uma Suthersanen, Excluding Designs (and Shape Marks): Where Is the EU Court of 
Justice Going?, 50 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 157, 159 (2019) (“the CJEU is not 
merely aligning the interpretations of the functionality clauses, but may be embarking on a far more 
ambitious policy programme in relation to all three-dimensional objects.”). 
27 Irene Calboli, Chocolate, Fashion, Toys and Cabs: The Misunderstood Distinctiveness of Non-
Traditional Trade Marks, 1 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION LAW 1-2 (2018). 
28 Maeve Lynch, Product Configuration Marks: The Shape of Things to Come, 12 J. INTELL. 
PROP. LAW & PRAC. 465, 465 (2017);  Apostolos Chronopoulos, De Jure Functionality of Shapes 
Driven by Technical Considerations in Manufacturing Methods 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 286, 286 (2017); 
Gabriele Engels & Claire Lehr, Sweets, Cars and Bottles - Three Dimensional Trade Marks?, 12 J. 
INTELL. PROP. LAW & PRAC. 797 (2017); Antoon Quaedvlieg, Shapes with a Technical Function: An 
Ever-Expanding Exclusion?, 1 ERA FORUM 101, 101 (2016). 
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II. PART I 
A. The Ration Legis of the European Functionality Criteria  
Functional features offer utilitarian advantages that consumers are likely to 
seek in the products of competitors. European law thus assumes that reserving such 
features to one single trader may confer abnormal advantages and reduce rather 
than enhance competition in the market. In Lego, the CJEU identified the pro-
competition considerations that the EU legislature sought to balance in the wording 
of the functionality provision. Firstly, in explaining the rules laid down by the 
legislature, the Court affirmed the two-fold rationale underpinning the public 
interest behind European functionality, namely the “anti-monopoly” criterion and the 
“demarcation” criterion.  Under the anti-monopoly criterion, functionality seeks “to 
prevent trade mark law granting an undertaking a monopoly on technical solutions 
or functional characteristics of product,” particularly where those solutions have been 
previously protected by another IP right.29  This anti-monopoly criterion runs 
through all the three forms of functionality in ex-Art.3(1)(e).30  Furthermore, under 
the “demarcation” criterion, functionality seeks to keep separate the subject-matter 
of trade mark protection from that afforded by other time-limited IP rights.  The 
concern behind this demarcation criterion is to avoid limiting the freedom of 
competitors supplying products incorporating a technical solution or reducing 
permanently their choices.  However, the central aim of this criterion is not to 
prevent cumulation of rights per se.  EU law in fact allows for the possibility of 
several forms of IP protection over the same object.31  Rather, the additional aim of 
EU functionality doctrine is much broader.32 Its purpose is “overwhelmingly to 
protect competition,”33 and this overriding aim percolates through all the sub-
categories of functionality, i.e. natural, technical and aesthetic shapes. Its rationale 
is far removed from the essential source-indicating function of the trade mark.  
The CJEU sees the freedom of traders to compete in absolute terms and the 
rationale of the statutory provision “is tied to the problem of anti-competitive 
protection in relation to ‘technical solutions’ and ‘functional characteristics’ of a 
product.”34 On the other hand, the CJEU in Lego held that the terms “exclusively” 
and “necessary” serve to restrict the scope of functionality as the legislature 
acknowledged that “any shape of goods is, to a certain extent, functional and that it 
would therefore be inappropriate to refuse to register a shape of goods as trade mark 
 
29 Case C-48/09, Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (¶¶ 43, 45). 
30 Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd, 
2002 E.C.R. I-377 (¶ 78) (‘The rationale of the grounds for refusal of registration laid down in 
Art.3(1)(e)…’). 
31 Council Regulation 6/2002 of Dec. 12, 2001, On Community Designs, 2001 O.J. (L 003) 4 (EC).  
32 Uma Suthersanen, The European Court of Justice in Philips v Remington – Trade Marks and 
Market Freedom, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 257, 275 (2003). 
33 Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (Opinion of AG Mengozzi, at ¶ 74). 
34 Uma Suthersanen, The European Court of Justice in Philips v Remington – Trade Marks and 
Market Freedom, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 257, 268 (2003). 
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solely on the ground that it has functional characteristics.”35  Therefore, the limiting 
effect of these terms is that functionality solely covers product shapes which only 
incorporate a technical solution; the presence of one or more minor arbitrary element 
cannot alter the conclusion that they are purely functional.  Conversely, utilitarian 
functionality cannot apply if a product shape incorporates “a major non-functional 
element, such as a decorative or imaginative element which plays an important role 
in the shape.”36  Taken together, therefore, the wording “necessary” and “exclusively” 
strike a balance between permanent exclusion of purely functional signs and 
potential protection of arbitrary signs merely having some functionality.  
B. Does Classification of Marks Really Matter?  
Recent high-profile cases such as the Louboutin red-soled shoes litigation and 
other ongoing disputes demonstrate that classification does really matter.37  There 
are significant legal consequences in determining the type of mark concerned. 
Indeed, under EU trade mark law, the distinction between different types of marks 
has a significant influence not only on their subject-matter of protection but also on 
the type of assessments and the policy considerations underpinning the applicable 
grounds.38  Given that by express desire of the EU legislature functional shapes (or 
another characteristic, as of 2016) can never be protected even after acquiring source 
significance or secondary meaning, avoiding functionality’s mortal blow constitutes 
tactical behavior.39  This paper argues that this has created two illogical approaches.  
While the CJEU adopts an over-inclusive approach to its modified analytical 
framework for distinctiveness evaluations, it takes a far more under-inclusive 
(formalistic) approach to functionality.  For instance, the undefined concept of 
“shape” is usually understood as “a set of lines or contours that outline the product 
concerned,” and cannot extend to a position mark comprising the application of a 
colour per se to a specific part of a  product as in Louboutin’s red outsole mark.40  Nor 
can “shape” cover a pattern mark comprising decorative motifs and words, which is 
 
35 Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (¶ 48).  See also, Case C-421/15, Yoshida 
Metal Industry Co v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-360 (¶ 26). 
36 Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (¶ 52).  See also, Case C-421/15, Yoshida 
Metal Industry Co v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-360 (¶ 27). 
37 Case C-21/18, Textilis Ltd v. Sveskt Tenn AB, 2019 E.C.R. I-199; Case C-578/17, Oy Hartwall 
Ab v. Patentti-ja rekisterihallitus, 2019 E.C.R. I-261; Case C-163/16, Christian Louboutin v. Van 
Haren Shoenen BV, 2018 E.C.R. I-423; Case C-26/17, Birkenstock Sales GmbH v. EUIPO, 2018 
E.C.R. 714; Case T-447/16, Pirelli Tyre SpA v. EUIPI, 2018 E.C.R. II-709, appeal pending (Case C-
818/18 and Case C-6/19); Case T-68/16, Deichmann SE v. EUIPO, 2018 E.C.R. II-7, appeal pending 
(Case C-223/18 P). 
38 Case C-578/17, Oy Hartwall Ab v. Patentti-ja rekisterihallitus, 2019 E.C.R. I-261 (¶ 35).  See 
also, Dev Gangjee, Paying the Price for Admission: Non-Traditional Marks Across Registration and 
Enforcement, in THE PROTECTION OF NON-TRADITIONAL MARKS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 59, 63 
(Irene Calboli & Martin Senftleben eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2018). 
39 Dev Gangjee, Paying the Price for Admission: Non-Traditional Marks Across Registration and 
Enforcement, in THE PROTECTION OF NON-TRADITIONAL MARKS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 59, 63 
(Irene Calboli & Martin Senftleben eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2018) (outlining the scope for 
applicants’ tactical behaviour at the characterisation stage.). 
40 Case C-163/16, Christian Louboutin v. Van Haren Shoenen BV, 2018 E.C.R. I-423 (¶ 21). 
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affixed to fabric or paper.41  This formalistic view of ‘shape’ contrasts with the more 
permissive approach to regarding a stitching pattern in the design of trousers as an 
aesthetically functional “shape.”42  More importantly, this formalistic view bypasses 
the articulated policy concerns underpinning EU functionality.  In Textilis, the CJEU 
held that the existence of time-limited copyright protection for the MANHATTAN 
pattern mark was irrelevant for the purpose of characterizing the mark as consisting 
‘exclusively of the shape,”43 without even discussing functionality’s broader policy of 
preventing the use of trade mark law to extend indefinitely other time-limited IP 
rights.  Nor did the Court’s formalistic reasoning in Louboutin consider the risk of 
permanent market foreclosure by excessively restricting competitors’ freedom in a 
market where economic development is based on a cyclical use of earlier aesthetic 
innovations and materials within a limited number of appealing colours.   
Neither Louboutin nor Textilis is easy to reconcile with Dyson.  In Dyson, 
functionality provided “a broader interpretative framework”44 to prevent registration 
of the novel concept of a bagless hoover that would result in undue monopolies within 
the eligibility requirement of “a sign.”  Dyson attempted to register a mark that 
consisted of “a transparent bin or collection chamber forming part of the external 
surface of a vacuum cleaner as shown in the representation.”45  Along with this 
description, it submitted images of two bagless vacuum cleaners with external bins 
as mere examples and specifically stated that the mark was not for a shape but for a 
non-specific transparent bin.46  This strategy meant that the (then) functionality 
objections could not apply.  This however did not prevent the CJEU taking a broader 
view to hold that the application did not satisfy the definitional requirement that a 
mark must be “sign” under (ex-)Art.2 TMD (now Art.3 recast Directive) in the sense 
of being a particular type of subject-matter.  Instead, the application was “capable of 
taking on a multitude of different appearances and [was] thus not specific.”47  The 
Dyson mark was also insufficiently defined, lacking clarity and precision 
underpinning the (then) requirement of graphic representation.48  The Dyson 
application however was more than a simple specificity problem.  The Court 
interpreted other eligibility requirements in accordance with the logic and policy 
concerns underpinning functionality when it stated that the purpose of a “sign” 
requirement is “to prevent the abuse of trade mark law in order to obtain an unfair 
competitive advantage.”49  Thus, “it [was] the prevention of undue monopolies which 
the court [saw] as the key problem with the application.”50  The CJEU expressed 
concern that the exclusivity inherent in trade mark rights would entitle Dyson “to 
prevent its competitors from marketing vacuum cleaners having any kind of 
 
41 Case C-21/18, Textilis Ltd v. Sveskt Tenn AB, 2019 E.C.R. I-199 (¶ 36). 
42 Case C-371/06, Benetton Group SpA v. G-Star Int BV, 2007 E.C.R. I-542 (the shape marks 
consisted of an oval kneepad and two lines of sloping stitching from hip height to crotch height.). 
43 Textilis Ltd v. Sveskt Tenn AB, 2019 E.C.R. I-199 (¶ 45). 
44 Vlotina Liakatou & Sypros Maniatis, Lego – Building a European Concept of Functionality, 
12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 653, 653 (2010). 
45 Case C-321/03, Dyson v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2007 E.C.R. I-51 (¶ 10). 
46 Id. (¶ 19). 
47 Id. (¶ 37). 
48 Id. (Opinion of AG Léger, at ¶¶ 62-63). 
49 Id. (¶ 34.) 
50 Edward Smith, Dyson and the Public Interest: An Analysis of the Dyson Trade Mark Case, 
11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 469, 472 (2007). 
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transparent collecting bin on their external surface, irrespective of its shape.”51  It 
thus internalized competition concerns within general eligibility criteria using 
functionality’s broader aims.  Indeed, AG Léger purposively argued that the general 
competition interest underpinning (ex)Art.3(1)(e) militated against registration of a 
technical feature notwithstanding the provision’s reference to “exclusively of the 
shape.”52   
By contrast, a wide range of unconventional marks such as colours, colour 
combinations, packaging, position marks, surface patterns, surface decoration, and 
sounds are treated as “shapes” for the purpose of the rigorous “departs significantly” 
test to gauge potential consumer predisposition to source.53  Under this modified 
distinctiveness test, average consumers are normally assumed not to be in the habit 
of making assumptions about the origin of goods on the basis of “their shape or the 
shape of their packaging”54 in the absence of any graphic or word element.  Thus, 
“the more closely the shape for which registration as a mark is sought resembles the 
shape most likely to be taken by the product in question, the greater the likelihood of 
the shape being devoid of any distinctive character.”55  In contrast, “only a sign which 
departs significantly from the norm or customs of the sector and thereby fulfills its 
essential function of indicating origin”56 is not devoid of any distinctiveness.  The 
combined effect of the normative presumption and the modified test is to make it 
harder for applicants to claim inherent source significance for those unconventional 
categories of marks than it is regarding word/figurative marks. Strictly speaking, 
however such unconventional marks are not “shapes.”  On the other hand, settled 
case-law states that the formal categorization of a sign as a figurative mark, be it 
three-dimensional or otherwise, a positional colour mark or “other” undefined 
category, is not a decisive factor for assessing its inherent source-identifying capacity 
in the eyes of average consumers.57  The CJEU has accepted the principle that the 
decisive factor is not so much a mark’s formal classification as its intrinsic 
characteristics of being indistinguishable or indissociable from the appearance of the 
designated goods.  This indissociability criterion implies “the existence of a 
resemblance between the sign and the products, or some of the products, it covers,” 
and the connection must be perceptible by the relevant public.58  This is not an 
abstract evaluation; it requires a close examination of the nature of the goods.  Nor is 
that connection dependent upon an objective impossibility of technical separation.59  
Indissociability is therefore a central criterion for applying the case-law and 
principles developed around three-dimensional marks, particularly the empirical rule 
 
51 Dyson v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2007 E.C.R. I-51 (¶ 38). 
52 Id. (Opinion of AG Léger, at ¶ 88). 
53 For a discussion of this unexplored distinctiveness test, see Cesar J. Ramirez-Montes, Trade 
Marking the Look and Feel of Business Environments in Europe, 25 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 75, 103-109 
(2019). 
54 Case C-417/16, August Storck KG v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-340 (¶ 34) (packaging mark); Case 
C-26/17, Birkenstock Sales GmbH v. EUIPO, 2018 E.C.R. I-714 (¶ 32) (wavy patter mark). 
55 Case C-445/13, Voss of Norway ASA v. OHIM, 2015 E.C.R. I-303 (¶ 91). 
56 Case C-417/16, August Storck KG v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-340 (¶ 35); Case C-26/17, 
Birkenstock Sales GmbH v. EUIPO, 2018 E.C.R. I-714 (¶ 33). 
57 Case C-429/10, X Technology Swiss GmbH v OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. I-307 (¶ 33). See also, 
Birkenstock Sales GmbH v. EUIPO, 2018 E.C.R. I-714 (¶ 36). 
58 Case C-26/17, Birkenstock Sales GmbH v. EUIPO, 2018 E.C.R. I-714 (¶ 37). 
59 Id. (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 49). 
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about consumer perception underpinning the “departs significantly” test.  Moreover, 
the Court has recently confirmed the lower threshold for the application of the 
indissociability criterion to surface pattern marks that enhance the aesthetic 
appearance of goods, largely on the policy concern that the applicant’s categorization 
of the mark as submitted should not escape the more demanding conditions for 
assuming source identification.60  
This technique enables EU tribunals to capture instances where the applicant’s 
tactical move is "to claim that a mark belongs to a more conventional category” and 
thus “bypass substantive examination criteria based upon policy concerns.”61  The 
normative rules underpinning the “departs significantly” criterion have proved a 
significant obstacle for a broad range of unconventional product trade dress brands.62  
The CJEU has yet to articulate the policy concerns underpinning its modified 
distinctiveness test.  Yet as I have argued elsewhere, the normative presumption 
about consumer visual habits constitutes a control device in the sense of being the 
Court’s unarticulated policy as a (temporary) measure for maintaining unrestricted 
access to basic or fundamental design standards and ordinary features common to 
the trade, thereby supporting product market competition.63  This pro-competition 
policy makes it difficult for trade dress claims to succeed simply on the basis of 
novelty or unusualness.  This is by no means a permanent or insurmountable 
measure as applicant can always invest in developing source significance.64  While in 
practice unconventional marks (including “shapes”) usually need market use before 
producing evidence of secondary meaning for protection, distinctiveness is not 
 
60 Id. (¶ 40) (upholding the ‘mere possibility’ criterion that the figurative mark–displaying a 
repetitive sequence of elements–will be used as a surface pattern for the relevant goods and thus 
indissociable from their appearance.). 
61 Dev Gangjee, supra note 39, at ¶ 73.  
62 It is clearly applicable beyond the traditional categories of product shapes and product 
packaging.  For instance, single colour marks, see Christian Louboutin v. Van Haren Shoenen BV, 
2018 E.C.R. I-423 (Second Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 64); For position marks, see also Case C-
521/13, Think Schuhwerk GmbH v. OHIM, 2014 E.C.R. I-2222 (red aglets on shoe laces); Case C-
429/10, X Technology Swiss GmbH v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. 307 (orange colouring of the toe of a sock); 
Case T-433/12, Margarete Steiff GmbH v. OHIM, 2014 E.C.R. II-8 (metal button in the middle 
section of the ear of a soft toy); Case T-331/12, Sartorius Lab Instruments GmbH & Co. KG v. 
OHIM, 2014 E.C.R. II-87 (yellow curve at the bottom edge of an electronic display unit); Case T-
152/07, Lange Uhren GmbH v. OHIM, 2009 E.C.R. II-324 (geometric shapes on a watch-face).  For 
designs applied to the surface of the goods, see Case C-445/02, Graverbel v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. 393, 
(surface decoration); Case C-307/11, Deichmann SE v. OHIM, 2012 E.C.R. I-254 (stitching applied to 
shoes).  For pattern marks, see Case T-359/12, LVM v. Nanu-Nana Handelsgesellschaft mbH für 
Geschenkartikel & Co. KG, 2015 E.C.R. II-215; Case T-360/12, LVM v. Nanu-Nana 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH für Geschenkartikel & Co. KG, 2015 E.C.R. II-214 (chequerboard patterns 
applied to leather goods) aff’d  Case C-363/15 & C-364/15, LVM v. Nanu-Nana Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH für Geschenkartikel & Co. KG 2016 E.C.R. I-595 (court order without decision as parties 
settled amicably); Case T-376/10, V. Fraas GmbH v. OHIM, 2012 E.C.R. II-436 (¶ 64) (tartan 
pattern in dark grey, light grey, black, beige, dark red and light red).  For the presentational method 
of the surface of bottles, see Case C-344/10, Freixenet SA v. OHIM 2011 E.C.R. I-680; Case C-345/10, 
Freixenet SA v. OHIM 2011 E.C.R. I-680 (joined with Case C-344/10). 
63 Cesar J. Ramirez-Montes, Trade Marking the Look and Feel of Business Environments in 
Europe, 25 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 75, 106 (2019). 
64 See EU Directive 2008/95/EC, art. 3(3), 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25 (EU), which is now Art.4(4) 
(recast) Directive 2015/2436, art. 4(4), 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1 (EU); Regulation 2017/1001, art. 7(3), O.J. 
(L 154) (EU). 
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intended to play the greatest role in safeguarding competition.  That is the role of 
functionality, and under EU law the tripartite functionality criteria constitute “a 
preliminary obstacle” that may permanently prevent registration of shapes.65  The 
next section examines each of these criteria under (ex)Art.3(1)(e)(now Art.4(1)(e)) 
Directive and Art.7(1)(e) ETMR.  
III. PART II 
A. Shape (or Another Characteristic) that Results from the Nature of the Goods 
Themselves 
The first criterion for excluding functional signs–shapes resulting from the 
nature of the goods themselves–has not featured prominently in reported decisions.  
Up until the CJEU’s ruling in Hauck, the precise meaning and normative content of 
this criterion was for all intents and purposes unknown.  Isolated decisions at OHIM 
(now EUIPO) described it as prohibiting “unavoidable shape” marks in the sense of 
excluding “the shape imposed by the nature of the goods themselves and without 
which those goods would not exist.”66  Unavoidable shapes meant the “the shape of 
natural goods or those which have become standardized in trade and in consumer 
opinion.”67  In other words, shapes created by nature or standardized by law.  For 
commentators, the banning of natural shapes of the goods themselves was initially 
understood to constitute “the purest example of the principles that trade mark 
protection shall not be used to foreclose markets.”68  It was thus interpreted as 
precluding protection only if there was evidence of no other shape available for 
products of the same species.  Examples of the concerns underpinning this 
permanent foreclosure situation included applications for an oval shape designating 
balls or natural shapes such as the shape of a banana for bananas.  However, in the 
wake of Hauk, it has become clear that the normative content of this criterion has a 
much broader scope.  Hauck concerned the design of a children’s high chair called the 
“Tripp-Trapp” chair that was protected both as a registered mark and as an artistic 
copyright work.  In an infringement action, defendant Hauck counterclaimed raising 
functionality as an invalidity ground.  In its reply to several referred questions, the 
CJEU ruled that the natural signs criterion is not limited to shapes that are 
indispensable to the function of the goods but “may [also] apply to a sign which 
consists exclusively of the shape of a product with one or more essential 
characteristics which are inherent to the generic function or functions of that product 
 
65 Case C-215/14, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK, 2015 E.C.R. I-604 (¶ 38). 
66 Salvatore Ferragamo Italia, Case R-272/1999-3, 3rd Board of Appeal, May 3, 2000, OFF. 
HARMONIZATION INTERNAL MKT. ¶ 24 (unreported); Salvatore Ferragamo Italia, Case R-395/1999-3, 
3rd Board of Appeal, May 3, 2000, OFF. HARMONIZATION INTERNAL MKT. ¶ 24 (unreported). 
67 Salvatore Ferragamo Italia, Case R-272/1999-3, 3rd Board of Appeal, May 3, 2000, OFF. 
HARMONIZATION INTERNAL MKT. ¶ 24 (unreported); Salvatore Ferragamo Italia, Case R-395/1999-3, 
3rd Board of Appeal, May 3, 2000, OFF. HARMONIZATION INTERNAL MKT. ¶ 24 (unreported). 
68 ANNETTE KUR & MARTIN SEFTLEBEN, EUROPEAN TRADE MARK LAW, A COMMENTARY 163 
(2017). 
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and which consumers may be looking for in the products of competitors.”69  The Court 
clarified that the three functionality exclusions share the same unifying rationale, 
namely to keep in the public domain essential characteristics of products which are 
reflected in their shape and which rivals need to compete effectively.70  EU 
functionality doctrine is therefore largely underpinned by the same competition 
concerns as US functionality.71   
Hauck therefore clarified that the natural shapes exclusion covers three 
situations: a) “natural” products which have no substitute, i.e. the shape of a banana 
for bananas; b) “regulated” products which are prescribed by legal standards, i.e. a 
rugby ball, and c) “generic” designs, that is, “shapes with essential characteristics 
which are inherent to the generic function or functions of such goods . . . .”72  The 
Court’s reasoning follows very closely the Opinion of the AG, who took the view that 
the natural signs criterion cannot be limited to standard shapes or shapes which are 
determined by regulation.  According to the AG, such a regulated shape of the goods 
is likely to be non-distinctive which would fail under (ex-)Art.3(1)(b) and it cannot 
have been the intention of the legislator to duplicate the same exclusionary ground. 
Some commentators are critical of the Court’s interpretation.  They complain that it 
raises the question of how the first criterion (natural shapes) relates to the second 
criterion (shape necessary to achieve a technical result).73  This allegedly causes 
particular uncertainty because the generic function(s) that consumers expect the 
shape of the branded product to perform comes very close to the normative content of 
the shape whose essential functional characteristics are all linked to a technical 
solution that consumers may look for in the products of competitors.  Their second 
complaint is that Hauck blurs the distinction between shapes that are merely non-
distinctive (for which protection may be temporarily denied until a showing of 
secondary meaning) and those that may fall under the criterion’s scope (for which 
protected is denied indefinitely).74 As discussed in Part I, non-inherently distinctive 
shapes are excluded if they fail to depart significantly from the norm or customs of 
the sector.  However, according to these critics, “shapes conforming to the norms and 
customs of the sector are exactly those that consumers will be looking for in the 
products of competitors.”75  Thus, the borderline between permanent and 
(potentially) temporary exclusions is blurred.  
There are several problems with these criticisms.  Firstly, the absolute grounds 
for refusing registration share a high degree of internal overlap,76 which reflects the 
wider function of trade mark law to protect the marketplace in several ways.  Thus, if 
a shape mark is descriptive of the artefact, it infringes not only descriptiveness in 
 
69 Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (¶ 27). 
70 Id. (¶ 20) (citing with approval Opinion of AG Szupnar, at ¶ 28). 
71 W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir, 1985) (Hon. J. Posner stating that 
the characteristic oval shape of an American football may be functional for the same reasons, i.e. it 
would be found in all or most brands of the product.). 
72 Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (¶¶ 24-25). 
73 ANNETTE KUR & MARTIN SEFTLEBEN, EUROPEAN TRADE MARK LAW, A COMMENTARY 163 
(2017). 
74 Id. at 164. 
75 Id.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
76 Case C-51/10, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol sp. z o.o. v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. I-139 (¶ 47); 
Case C-363/99, Koninklijke KPN Nederland NV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, 2004 E.C.R. I-86 (¶ 67) 
(Postkantoor). 
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(ex-)Art.3(1)(c) but also the natural shapes exclusion in (ex-)Art.3(1)(e)(i).77  
Similarly, shape-of-product marks that are necessary to achieve a technical result 
under (ex-)Art.3(1)(e)(ii) may also be excluded under the grounds that they indicate 
the purpose of the goods (descriptive), are generic (customary) and/or cannot function 
as source-identifiers for consumers (non-distinctive).  Secondly, according to settled 
case-law, the absolute grounds for refusal are broadly divided into two categories, 
namely those that view non-registrability from the perspective of average consumers 
(general distinctiveness criterion) and those that protect market competition by 
keeping certain signs free in the public domain because their permanent registration 
may affect the ability of others to offer competing products (functionality criteria).78  
The latter grounds require an objective assessment, for which consumer perception is 
not decisive but, at most, may be one factor amongst many others.79  The perception 
of the target consumers is taken as a basis for assessing the significant departure of 
the shape mark and whether, by way of a prognosis decision, the shape or design 
claimed as a mark correlates to what consumers would expect the designated goods 
to take.  By contrast, the identification of the essential characteristics of the shape to 
appraise whether they are all inherent to the generic function(s) that the goods are 
intended to perform is an objective appraisal.  Secondly, whilst it is true that the 
broader interpretation endorsed in Hauck focuses upon the practical generic 
function(s) of the goods, this is not the same as the need for a “technical effect” as 
required for utilitarian shapes in (ex-)Art.3(1)(e)(ii).  Indeed, in his “instructive”80 
Opinion, the AG stressed that certain generic characteristics of a shape may have a 
particularly significant effect upon the function that a product performs.  Thus, 
“[t]hey can also be characteristics of a shape which are difficult to identify as 
necessary to obtain a ‘technical effect’ within the meaning of the second indent” of 
(ex-)Art.3(1)(e)(ii).81  This is a central distinction often overlooked in opinions 
suggesting that Hauck’s interpretation creates an overlap in which the first 
exclusionary criterion arguably contains a much broader concept than the second.82   
Nevertheless, those generic characteristics affecting substantially the function of 
the product concerned are also features which consumers are likely to seek in the 
products of all competitors.  Echoing an economic effects assessment, the AG Opinion 
highlighted that “they are features of a shape for which there is no equally good 
substitute” and their monopolization by a single trader “would make it difficult for 
competing undertakings to give the goods a shape which was equally suitable for 
 
77 Uma Suthersanen, supra note 32, at 275 (“Art.3(1)(e) and the distinctiveness criterion are 
two facets which combine to ensure the proper functioning of the marketplace by excluding shapes 
which, if protected, would ‘function’ physically and/or conceptually to narrow the choices available to 
other market traders.”). 
78 Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (¶ 33) (citing Lego 
Juris v OHIM, at ¶ 75, and Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 88). 
79 Id. (¶¶ 34-35) 
80 LIONAL BENTLY ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 964 (5th ed. 2018). 
81 Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG 
Szpunar, at ¶ 56) 
82 Anton Quaedvlieg, Shapes With a Technical Function: An Ever-Expanding Exclusion?, 1 ERA 
FORUM 101, 115 (2016) (arguing that the generic function criterion underpinning the CJEU’s 
interpretation of the natural shapes exclusion could have a far broader reach than the technical 
necessity exclusion itself.); KUR & SENFTLEBEN, supra note 68, at 164.  
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use.”83  The CJEU agreed, evoking the criterion’s public interest aim in preventing 
the trade mark proprietor obtaining a significant advantage.84  It is entirely unclear 
why the potential for a (negative) overlap between the natural shapes criterion and 
the non-distinctiveness objections should cause significant uncertainty.  To start 
with, where several of the absolute grounds for refusal may apply it is mandatory to 
undertake a prior functionality assessment of the proposed trade dress mark.  
Indeed, functionality is a preliminary obstacle to the registration of all shapes 
despite its position within the legislation and, once there is a functionality finding, 
there is no need to consider further the potential for source-identifying potential 
since functional shapes can never be saved by demonstrating source significance.  
This is not to say that post-Hauck the CJEU’s articulation has resulted in “a 
useful guideline on which courts and offices can base their decision.”85  Kur and 
Sentfleben have referred to the Nestlé SA v Cadbury reference and the Best-Lock 
(Europe) v Lego Juris A/S appeal as examples where, had the Hauck criteria for 
excluding natural shapes been properly applied, a different set of results might have 
emerged.  In Nestlé SA v Cadbury, the contested shape of the Kit-Kat four-fingered 
chocolate bar was found to contain three essential features, the slab form (which 
resulted from the nature of the goods themselves) and the V-shaped grooves 
separating the four fingers (which were necessary to achieve a technical result).86  
For these authors, pursuant to the Hauck’s expansive interpretation of the natural 
shapes criterion, both the slab shape and the presence and number of grooves are 
inherent in the generic function of the product, i.e. to be eaten in portions.87  Similar 
considerations might apply to the shape of the little Lego man or “manikins” 
registered as EUTMs.  In this case, Best-lock requested the cancellation of the 
registration on the basis that the shape of the Lego man was determined by the 
nature of the goods themselves and it was also necessary to provide the technical 
solution of joining the toy figures (through holes under its feet) to Lego toy bricks.  
The Board rejected the request, largely on the ground that the applicant Best-lock 
had neither offered evidence of functionality nor developed arguments properly.88  
The GCEU dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the essential characteristics of the 
Lego man trade mark (i.e. head, body, arms and legs which are necessary to confer a 
human appearance) did not serve any technical result.   Moreover, “the result of that 
shape [was] simply to confer human traits on the figure” and “the fact that the figure 
ha[d] technical qualities ha[d] no influence in the context of applying Art.7(1)(e)(ii).”89  
However, according to Kur and Senftleben, had it been considered that the stylized 
shape of the Lego man shape displayed the very features that consumers expect of 
such toy figures, the result would most likely have been different. Indeed, the 
essential characteristics may be inherent to the generic function of the manikins, i.e. 
 
83 Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG 
Szpunar, at ¶ 57-58). 
84 Id. 
85 KUR & SENFTLEBEN, supra note 68, at 163. 
86 Case C-215/14, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK, 2015 E.C.R. I-604 (¶ 72). 
87 KUR & SENFTLEBEN, supra note 68, at 164. 
88 Case T-395/14, Best-Lock (Europe) v. Lego Juris A/S, 2015 E.C.R. II-379 (¶ 7). 
89 Case T-395/14, Best-Lock (Europe) v. Lego Juris A/S, 2015 E.C.R. II-379 (¶¶ 35, 38).  A 
further appeal to the CJEU was dismissed by a [brief] reasoned order, see Case C-452/15, Best-Lock 
(Europe) v. Lego Juris A/S, 2016 E.C.R. I-270. 
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to confer human traits on the toy figures, contrary to the natural shapes exclusion.  
Moreover, it is common in EU law to find cases where distinctiveness rather than 
functionality is called upon to refuse registration of shape marks resulting from the 
nature of the goods themselves.90 
B. Shape (or Another Characteristic) Necessary to Obtain a Technical Result  
The criterion for excluding technical shapes is by far the most common obstacle 
for product trade dress marks.  It was also the first criterion to offer the CJEU the 
initial opportunity to articulate the policies underpinning the European functionality 
doctrine, the assessment method and the doctrine’s relationship with the other 
general requirements of distinctiveness.  Unsurprisingly, there is far more case-law 
around technical functionality than on any other of the criteria in indents (i) and (iii).  
The Court nonetheless has yet to interpret the new wording of functional 
“characteristics” in cases involving non-shape functionality.  The leading judgements 
on essentially functional shapes are Remington91 and Lego,92 both of which concerned 
challenges to the registrations of shape marks that had previously been protected by 
other IP rights. Since these two rulings, there are have been more recent cases that 
have shed more light onto the proper application of the utilitarian functionality 
criteria and the doctrine’s limits.  According to Remington, a sign consists exclusively 
of a shape necessary to achieve a technical result “where the essential functional 
characteristics of the shape of a product are attributable solely to the technical 
result . . .even if that result can be achieved by other shapes.”93  Lego affirmed this 
interpretation, clarifying further that technical functionality applies “only where all 
the essential characteristics of the sign are functional.”94 
Lego overwhelmingly confirmed the principle first articulated in Remington that 
European functionality is not grounded upon competitive necessity.  The policy 
concern of the EU functionality doctrine is not the competitive need of traders to copy 
functional product features for effective competition in the market concerned but on a 
much broader principle of avoiding undue competitive advantages which are 
unrelated to  competition based upon price and quality.95  This is so despite the 
potential for availability of alternative designs, consumer confusion and loss of 
business goodwill.  This echoes the same approach adopted by the US Supreme Court 
in Traffix.96  Thus, the CJEU rejected Lego’s complaint that its competitors need not 
offer slavish copies of its Lego bricks incorporating exactly the same technical 
 
90 Case C-476/15, Grupo Bimbo v. OHIM, 2016 E.C.R. I-165 (application to register the shape of 
a Mexican tortilla for snacks.). 
91 Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Remington, 2002 E.C.R. I-377. 
92 Case C-48/09, Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516. 
93 Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Remington, 2002 E.C.R. I-377 (¶ 83) 
(emphasis added). 
94 Case C-48/09, Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (¶ 52) (emphasis added). 
95 Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG 
Szpunar, at ¶ 79). 
96 In fact, the Opinion of the AG and the Grand Board of Appeal at the EUIPO cited Traffix in 
their functionality assessments.  See Case C-48/09, Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-
516 (Opinion of AG Mengozzi, at ¶ 67). 
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solution.97  Claims of mere slavish imitation by competitors cannot alter the 
“particular strictness” of the legislature’s policy choice.98  Furthermore, Lego provides 
more guidance on the criteria for identifying the essential characteristics of a shape 
mark.99  The first step is to identify all the essential characteristics of the 3D mark, 
that is, “the most important elements of the sign” on a case-by-case basis without any 
hierarchy between its constituent elements.100  Thus, depending on the degree of 
difficulty, the essential characteristics can be identified either by a simple visual 
analysis or a more detailed examination consisting of surveys or expert reports 
including information about other IP rights previously granted.  However, unlike 
distinctiveness evaluations, for functionality assessments the presumed perception of 
the average consumer “is not a decisive element . . . but, at most, may be a relevant 
criterion of assessment” for the tribunal when it identifies the design’s essential 
characteristics.101  An additional step still requires the tribunal to ascertain “whether 
all [the essential characteristics identified] perform the technical function of the 
goods at issue.”102  This is where the presence of a major (non-technical) decorative or 
imaginative element becomes relevant but only to the extent that it plays an 
important role in the intended technical result.  
In Lego, although the colour red was a non-functional element of the design, this 
was a minor arbitrary element in its technical result, namely the assembly of toy-
bricks.103  The CJEU therefore endorsed the functionality findings that the most 
important element of the Lego brick mark consisted of two rows of studs on the upper 
surface of the brick and that element was necessary for the assembly result.  
Similarly, in Yoshida the mere fact that the pattern mark with an array of black dots 
for knife handles had ornamental and fanciful aspects did not preclude a 
functionality finding where such aspects played a minor role in the shape of the 
designated goods.104  The CJEU thus endorsed the finding that those black dots were 
not merely colouring painted onto the handles but actual dents on the surface of the 
handles, which constituted an essential characteristic of the non-skid technical 
solution of the shape.  Moreover, Lego and Yoshida highlight the relevance of the 
evidence regarding patent and design protection for a functionality finding.  For 
instance, in Lego the CJEU approved the reliance upon prior patents in assessing the 
functionality of the characteristics of the Lego brick.105  Yet the prior Lego patents 
were not treated as irrefutable evidence of the Lego brick’s utilitarian functionality 
but as “a simple, yet very powerful, presumption that the essential characteristics of 
 
97 Id. (¶ 59). 
98 Id. (¶ 47).  See also, Case C-421/15, Yoshida Metal Industry Co v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-360 
(¶ 34). 
99 Lego’s two-step test has been subsequently applied and confirmed in other decisions; see Case 
C-421/15, Yoshida Metal Industry Co v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-360 (¶ 29); Case C-30/15, Simba Toys 
v. Seven Towns, 2016 E.C.R. I-849 (¶ 40); Cases C-337/12 to C-340/12, Pi-Design AG v. Yoshida 
Metal Industry Co, 2014 E.C.R. I-129 (¶¶ 47-48). 
100 Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (¶¶ 69-70). 
101 Id. (¶ 76). 
102 Id. (¶ 72). 
103 Id. (¶¶ 73-74). 
104 Case C-421/15, Yoshida Metal Industry Co v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-360 (¶ 30). 
105 Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (¶ 85). 
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the shape . . . perform a technical function.”106   Similarly, in Yoshida all the essential 
characteristics identified by the Board at the EUIPO were disclosed in two American 
and European Patents that the proprietor had previously obtained.107  This too was a 
strong presumption of utilitarian functionality. 
 Case-law has also thwarted traders’ attempts to circumvent the fatal blow of 
functionality by classifying the sign as a figurative mark representing a two-
dimensional label or omitting a more detailed description of the mark as filed.  As 
discussed in Part I, this tactical behavior enables traders to assert that their marks 
do not constitute the “shape of goods” and cannot therefore be excluded on 
functionality grounds.  However, the CJEU has ruled that a correct application of the 
policies pursued by functionality (anti-monopoly and freedom to compete) requires 
consideration, where appropriate, of information about the function of the actual 
goods in addition to the graphic representation and any descriptions filed at the time 
of the grant of registration.108  The representation of the mark as filed cannot restrict 
the examiner’s evaluation of a potential functionality objection in such a way as 
might undermine the public interest underlying that provision.109  Thus, in Pi-
Design, the CJEU rejected the interpretation that “only the shape as reproduced in 
the registration application may be the subject-matter of the [functionality] 
examination.”110  Instead it endorsed the possibility that examiners may carry out a 
form of reverse engineering, i.e. finding out what the trade mark really represents on 
the basis of representations of the knives actually marketed by the proprietor.111  In a 
recent appeal involving cancellation proceedings against registration of the famous 
Rubik’s Cube as a EUTM, the CJEU had opportunity to clarify further the relevance 
of additional circumstances relating to the function of the actual goods beyond the 
requisite representation of the mark as submitted for registration, which is essential 
for the application of functionality.  In reversing the non-functionality findings, the 
CJEU in Simba Toys held that the assessment of the essential characteristics 
identified (i.e. the grid structure on each surface of the cube) must refer to “the 
technical function of the actual goods concerned.”112  It was therefore contrary to 
settled case-law to disregard knowledge of the rotating capability of the vertical and 
horizontal lattices of the Rubik’s Cube, notwithstanding the fact that this invisible 
mechanism internal to that cube could not be inferred objectively from the graphical 
representation of the mark as registered. Simba Toys affirmed the principle 
supported in PI-Design that, though the shape as represented graphically should be 
the basis for a functionality assessment, the analysis cannot proceed in the abstract 
“without using additional information on the actual goods.”113  In determining the 
 
106  Case C-48/09, Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (Opinion of AG Mengozzi, 
at ¶ 67).  
107 Cases T-331/10 to T-416/10, Yoshida Metal Industry Co v. OHIM, 2015 E.C.R. II-302 (¶ 46). 
108 Cases C-337/12 to C-340/12, Pi-Design AG v. Yoshida Metal Industry Co, 2014 E.C.R. I-129 
(¶ 54). 
109 Id. (¶ 58). 
110 Case T-331/10, Yoshida Metal Industry Co v. OHIM, 2015 E.C.R. II-302 (¶ 31); Case T-
416/10, Yoshida Metal Industry Co v. OHIM, 2015 E.C.R. II-302 (¶ 31). 
111 Cases C-337/12 to C-340/12, Pi-Design AG v. Yoshida Metal Industry Co, 2014 E.C.R. I-129 
(¶ 61). 
112 Case C-30/15, Simba Toys v. Seven Towns, 2016 E.C.R. I-849 (¶ 46). 
113 Id. (¶ 48). 
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true scope of the EU functionality doctrine, it is necessary always to consider the 
overriding policy concerns of (ex)Art.3(1)(e)/Art/7(1)(e).  Thus, the narrow view 
adopted by the lower tribunals imposed “an excessively high standard on the 
assessment of functional shapes which makes it possible to circumvent the 
prohibition on monopolization” under the statutory provision.114 
 There are other problematic decisions however where the expression “technical 
result” in the EU functionality doctrine has not been interpreted as broadly as one 
might expect.  In considering the alleged utilitarian functionality of the shape of the 
Kit Kat four finger chocolate-coated bar, the evidence before the examiner indicated 
that the angle of the sides of the product (and of the breaking grooves) was 
constrained by the specific method of manufacture.115  That manufacturing method is 
the most common and efficient chocolate molding process for multiple finger 
chocolate bar products.116  This prompted the national court to ask the CJEU 
whether the scope of the utilitarian shapes exclusion is restricted to the manner in 
which the relevant goods function or whether it also extends to the method of 
manufacturing the goods.  That is, whether utilitarian functionality covers both 
kinds of technical results, i.e. signs that are causally associated with the 
functionality of the branded goods as well as signs that are the expression of a 
particular manufacturing method.  Following a strict reading of the statutory text, 
the CJEU replied that extending utilitarian functionality to the manufacturing 
method for producing the goods is unsupported by the wording itself and by the 
overriding policy of the provision.  Functionality’s overriding aim is to prevent a 
monopoly on technical solutions which a user is likely to seek in the goods of 
competitors.  Thus, “from the consumer’s perspective, the manner in which the goods 
function is decisive and the method of manufacture is not important.”117   
The CJEU’s strict interpretation is in stark contrast with the proposed 
interpretation in the Opinion of its own Advocate General.  For AG Wathelet, a 
teleological interpretation of the provision could not logically ignore the contribution 
of the manufacturing process to the technical result attributed to the shape of the 
goods.  Accordingly, “it is possible . . . that that technical result may be obtainable 
only by means of a specific manufacturing process,” as was the case in Nestlé.118  The 
Advocate General recalled that the Court’s own description of the aim of the grounds 
in (ex)Art.3(1)(e) speaks of concerns that the exclusivity inherent in trade mark 
rights would “limit the possibility of competitors supplying a product incorporating [a 
technical] function or at least limit their freedom of choice in regard to the technical 
solution they wish to adopt in order to incorporate such as function in their 
 
114 Case C-30/15, Simba Toys v. Seven Towns, 2016 E.C.R. I-849 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at 
¶ 95). 
115 Case C-215/14, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK, 2015 E.C.R. I-604 (Opinion of 
AG Wathelet, at ¶ 75); Id. (¶ 67). 
116 Apostolos Chronopolous, De Jure Functionality of Shapes Driven by Technical 
Considerations in Manufacturing Methods, 3 IP QUARTERLY 286, 289-291 (2017) (explaining the 
efficiencies of this moulding process that Nestle uses for its Kit Kat four-finger chocolate bar). 
117 Case C-215/14, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK, 2015 E.C.R. I-604 (¶ 55); Id. 
(¶ 56) (In support of this narrow view, the CJEU further noted that the manufacturing method is 
not decisive to the assessment of the essential functional characteristics of a product shape). 
118 Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK, 2015 E.C.R. I-604 (Opinion of AG Wathelet, 
at ¶ 75). 
[19:38 2019]    Louboutin Heels and the Competition Goals of EU Trade Mark Law 55  
 
product.”119  In his view, the conjunction “or” implies that utilitarian functionality 
covers two distinct situations, the latter of which paraphrases “manufacturing 
process.”120  There is support amongst European scholars for this teleological 
argument.  For some scholars, the term “technical result” may include “different 
types of technical results including manufacturing efficiencies.”121  A purposive 
interpretation that excludes shapes that are associated with a specific manufacturing 
method is, apart from being teleologically justified, within the textual limits of the 
provision.122  To support their purposive arguments, European scholars draw 
attention to US law, which “explicitly takes into account the effect of trade dress 
protection on the practice of unpatented manufacturing processes within the context 
of functionality analysis.”123  Indeed, under US law, a product feature is functional 
and cannot serve as a trade mark “if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article 
or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”124  In particular, a functional feature 
affects the cost or quality of the article where “it permits the article to be 
manufactured at a lower cost” or “constitutes an improvement in the operation of the 
goods.”125  Therefore, if the overriding aim of EU functionality is to preserve the 
absolute freedom of competitors, it is then hard to see why “technical result” cannot 
cover shapes that are closely associated with a manufacturing process that is the 
superior method for producing the relevant goods, as was the case with the Kit Kat 
chocolate bar. 
C. Shape (or Another Characteristic) that Adds Substantial Value to the Goods 
This criterion has been described as “arbitrary and difficulty to apply,”126 having 
the same sort of “over-breadth problem”127 as the Pagliero approach to aesthetic 
functionality.  In a recent Opinion, AG Szpunar put it bluntly by complaining that it 
“is not worded clearly,” largely due to a lack of uniform views as to its true meaning 
and purpose.128  Indeed, it raises difficult questions of interpretation such as what is 
the “value” prohibited, which assessment criteria render the value “substantial,” and 
 
119 Id. (Opinion of AG Wathelet, at ¶ 76) (AG Opinion’s own emphasis). 
120 Id. (Opinion of AG Wathelet, at ¶ 77). 
121 Apostolos Chronopolous, supra note 116, at 297. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. at 296 (discussing the Morton-Norwich factors for determining utilitarian functionality, 
one of which specifically asks whether ‘a particular design results from a comparatively simple or 
cheap method of manufacturing the article.’). 
124 Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001) (quoting Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844, 850, n. 10 (1982)). 
125 Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 219 (2nd Cir. 
2012). 
126 Charles Gielen, Substantial Value Rule: How It Came into Being And Why It Should Be 
Abolished, 3 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 164, 168 (2014). 
127 Justin Hughes, Non-Traditional Trade Marks and the Dilemma of Aesthetic Functionality, in 
THE PROTECTION OF NON-TRADITIONAL MARKS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 107, 111 (Irene Calboli & 
Martin Senftleben eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2018).  See also, Justin Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic 
Functionality in Trade Mark Law, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227 (2015). 
128 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 69) 
(outlining the opposite views that originated in German case-law and scholarship, and in the case-
law of the EUIPO). 
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what is the importance of consumer perspective expressed in consumer 
needs/preferences.129  Many have questioned its unclear rationale calling for its 
abolition or amendment.130  Nonetheless, in the wake of the 2015 legislative revision, 
these hostile opinions went unheeded as EU policy-makers tacitly approved its 
important role within the trade mark system.  Prior to Hauck, the teleological 
premise widely adopted was that this criterion (also described as “aesthetic 
functionality”) seeks to demarcate trade mark protection and the protection offered 
by other time-limited IP rights such as copyright and designs.  However, this widely-
held view resulted in different interpretative approaches.  While one purposive 
interpretation treated the criterion as solely applying to works of art and applied art 
which permits the registration of product shapes that could also perform a utilitarian 
function (i.e. the design of a chair or an armchair), another purposive view argued 
that a finding that the shape gives substantial value to the goods does not preclude 
other characteristics (i.e. technical qualities of a loudspeaker) from also adding 
substantial value to those goods.131  For the latter view, the fact that a product 
performs a decorative as well as a practical function does not automatically rule out 
the possibility of applying the criterion. Underlying this more inclusive view is a 
recognition that product features may perform multiple functions; apart from their 
practical function, they can also satisfy other consumer needs.132  In Hauck, the AG 
Opinion proposed adopting the more inclusive purposive interpretation as this 
permits the overriding aim of the statutory provision to be fulfilled, namely to 
prevent the misuse of trade mark law exclusively for purposes which other IP 
regimes serve to attain.133  More broadly, to prevent the registration of non-
functional aesthetic features that are essential for effective competition in the 
relevant market in the sense that consumers may seek them in the products of 
competitors.  
The CJEU ruling in Hauck closely follows the Opinion of its AG. According to 
the ruling, the concept of “shape which gives substantial value to the goods” cannot 
“be limited to the shape of products having only artistic or ornamental value, as there 
is otherwise a risk that products which have essential functional characteristics as 
well as a significant aesthetic element will not be covered.”134  This goes beyond what 
was argued before, i.e. that the criterion’s rationale serves to demarcate between 
design, copyright and trademarks, and affirms “the competition leitmotiv” within all 
three functionality criteria.135  According to this view, an artefact may be protected 
under different rights without much ado as long as it satisfies specific protection 
criteria, which are underpinned with “an aligned supra-rationale, i.e. ensuring 
 
129 The London  Taxi Co v. Frazer-Nash Research Ltd [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1729 [76] (Eng.) 
(Floyd LJ identifying some difficulties). 
130 Charles Gielen, supra note 126, at 167; MAX PLANK INSTITUTE, Study on the Overall 
Functioning of the European Trade Mark System, § 2.34 (2011) 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/tm/20110308_allensbach-study_en.pdf. 
131 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at 
¶¶ 72-77). 
132 Id. (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 85). 
133 Id. (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 79). 
134 Id. (¶ 32). 
135 Uma Suthersanen, Excluding Designs (and Shape Marks): Where Is the EU Court of Justice 
Going?, 50 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 157, 159 (2019). 
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protection under these regimes does not restrict market freedom and competition.”136  
This permanent exclusion may thus cover out-of-copyright artworks (i.e. visual works 
and sculptures)137 and certain collector’s items138 but this is not the only situation 
envisaged.  It also extends to “all other practical objects in respect of which design is 
one of the fundamental elements which determine their attractiveness, and thus the 
market success of the goods concerned.”139  Obvious examples are jewelry or fine 
cutlery but also products in relation to which the external aesthetics of the shape 
play an essential role in a certain segment of the market, i.e. designer furniture and 
certain designer goods.140  In Hauck, the shape of the Tripp-Trapp children’s chair 
was found to give significant aesthetic value in addition to having other 
characteristics (safety, comfort and reliability), which gave it essential functional 
value.141  The ruling therefore offered an interpretation of a “blended shape,” i.e. one 
with “several characteristics.”  As regards the relevance of the motive(s) underlying 
the target public’s decision to purchase the shape, the CJEU simply repeated what it 
had already established in Lego, namely how the target public perceives the product 
shape cannot constitute a decisive element.142  The perspective of consumer 
motivation/need is merely one of several factors in identifying the “value” that the 
shape confers upon the goods.  Therefore, in addition to consumer perception, the 
CJEU went on to endorse other criteria proposed in the Opinion of the AG for 
determining whether the aesthetic value of a shape becomes “substantial” and thus 
ineligible for registration.143 
Hauck undoubtedly represents an expansion of the criteria for applying the legal 
test of aesthetic functionality under (ex-) Art.3(1)(e)(iii).  The ruling nonetheless 
leaves several important questions answered. Firstly, the CJEU did not articulate a 
positive definition of the “shape that gives substantial value to the goods” concept.  
Nor did it define what type of “value” tribunals must look for in the shape.  Is it 
“monetary” value or some other quality?  Is it the “value” derived from the 
proprietor’s reputation, or is it the intrinsic value of the design alone irrespective of 
 
136 Id. at 160. 
137 Case E-5/16, Municipality of Oslo v. Norwegian Board of Appeal for Industrial Property 
Rights, 2017 E.F.T.A. 6th April 2017, (unreported) https://eftacourt.int/download/5-16-
judgment/?wpdmdl=1649.  For comment on this dispute, see European Copyright Society, Trade 
Mark Protection for Public Domain Works: A Comment on the Request for an Advisory Opinion of the 
EFTA Court: Case E-5/16 –Norwegian Board of Appeal for Industrial Property Rights –Appeal from 
the Municipality of Oslo, 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 535 (2017). 
138 Bacardi & Co v. Occhi Blu Foundation, Case R-1313/2012-1, 2nd Board of Appeal, OFF. 
HARMONIZATION INTERNAL MKT. ¶ 17 (unreported) (diamond-shaped bottle for alcoholic beverages). 
139 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 81). 
140 Id. (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶¶ 82-85).  Under this CJEU’s interpretation, this value-
conferring criterion may also cover motor car shapes (see, The London Taxi Co v. Frazer-Nash 
Research Ltd [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1729 [73] (Eng.)) and the shape of a loudspeaker (see Case T-
508/08, Bang & Olufsen v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. II-575). 
141 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (¶ 29) 
142 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (¶ 34) (Consumer perception may, at most, be a 
relevant criterion in identifying the essential characteristic of the sign.). 
143 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (¶ 35) (the nature of the category of goods 
concerned, the artistic value of the shape in question, its dissimilarity from other shapes in common 
use on the market concerned, a substantial price difference in relation to similar products, and the 
development of a promotion strategy which focuses on accentuating the aesthetic characteristics of 
the product in question.). 
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brand reputation?  If so, how are tribunals to separate one from the other?  There are 
references to “attractiveness,” “appeal” and “aesthetic qualities” as strongly 
influencing consumer’s decision to purchase and thus as proxies for increasing the 
economic “value” of the goods in the Opinion of AG Spzunar.144  This dangerously 
echoes Pagliero’s “important ingredient” test of aesthetic functionality widely 
criticized in US law.145  Secondly, the CJEU is ambivalent about the relevance of 
consumer preferences and consumer needs in determining whether a shape mark 
confers substantial value to the goods.  Is it a purely objective test?  These 
uncertainties are deeply problematic, not least because the Court endorsed the AG 
view’s that objects are capable of fulfilling multiple consumer needs in addition to 
their practical functions.146  This recognition served as basis for not disapplying the 
exclusion when the object performs a decorative as well as a practical function.  
Consumer motivation/preferences therefore do have a far greater role in aesthetic 
functionality than the CJEU is prepared to acknowledge.  In Hauck, the AG 
highlighted that consumer perception might be of greater relevance in aesthetic 
functionality than in cases of utilitarian functionality, beyond merely identifying the 
essential characteristics of the shape.147  In what specific circumstances he did not 
elaborate.  Nonetheless, he went on to add an important qualification that nudges 
European aesthetic functionality away from Pagliero.  In his Opinion, the substantial 
value assessments must consider consumer perception in a much broader context.  In 
particular, the need to consider also “the economic effects which will result from 
reserving the sign concerned to a single undertaking” in order to answer the 
criterion’s ultimate question, i.e. “whether or not registration[] will have a negative 
impact on the placing of competing goods on the market.”148  
IV. PART III: TOWARDS AN EVOLVING APPROACH TO FUNCTIONALITY? 
The opportunity to discuss further the relevance of consumer perception when 
excluding protection of shapes for adding substantial value to the goods arose in 
Louboutin.  As stated above, in a brief decision the CJEU rejected the proposed 
interpretation in the two Opinions of AG Szpunar, ruling that “a sign consisting of a 
colour applied to the sole of a high-heeled shoe [such as the Louboutin mark], does 
not consist exclusively of a ‘shape’ within the meaning of [(ex-)Art.3(1)(e)(iii) 
Directive].”149  The question arose because the restrictive wording of this provision 
permits functionality exclusions only for “shape,” and it was unclear whether “shape” 
is limited to 3D properties of products or can also include other non-3D properties 
 
144 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶¶ 80, 81, 84, 85). 
145 W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir, 1985); Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, 
Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., 916 F.2d 76, 79 (2nd Cir, 1990) (citing cases). 
146 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (¶ 31). 
147 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, ¶ 92). 
148 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, ¶ 89). 
149 Christian Louboutin v. Van Haren Shoenen BV, 2018 E.C.R. I-423 (¶ 27).  The CJEU appears 
to consider the description attached by Louboutin when filing for registration as highly relevant for 
its decision. However, this is incompatible with the much broader views it adopted in Pi-Design and 
Simba Toys. 
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such as colour.150  In stark contrast to US law that requires non-functionality of all 
types of trade dress marks, European tribunals have to engage in this sort of mental 
gymnastics which the new wording of Art.4(1)(e) (recast) Directive arguably 
addresses.  In both Opinions, AG Szpunar argued for a more flexible interpretation of 
the undefined concept of “shape” in order to classify the Louboutin red sole mark as 
one consisting of “the shape of the goods and seeking protection for a colour in 
relation to that shape, rather than one consisting of a colour per se.”151  The 
suggested interpretation would permit applying an aesthetic functionality 
examination to a mark combining colour and shape (i.e. the Louboutin mark).  AG 
Szpunar considered several issues for adopting a teleological rather than a literal 
interpretation of the aesthetic functionality criterion, but his discussion of the 
“dynamic” nature of consumer aesthetic preferences merits close consideration.  
According to the AG, there is an important distinction among the types of 
functionality prohibited in (ex-)Art.3(1)(e).  While functionality excluding natural and 
technical shapes “relates to characteristics which have been pre-determined with 
lasting effect, namely those which exist by virtue of the goods themselves,”152 
functionality excluding value-adding shapes would “relate to [aesthetic] 
characteristics which are dependent on external factors”153 and in particular evolving 
consumer preferences.  In the case of utilitarian shapes, for example, the public’s 
perception of the goods is incapable of altering that state of affairs even when 
alternative shapes may achieve the same technical result.154  In contrast, when it 
comes to the “substantial value” criterion, its proper rationale allows “a characteristic 
to remain available for all market participants over the period during which that 
characteristic has a particular effect on the value of the goods.”155  However, “from 
the point at which that is no longer the case–inter alia . . . because the public’s 
preferences have changed and that characteristic is no longer sought and valued by 
the public”–the proposed shape mark would no longer potentially be rejected for 
being aesthetically functional.156 
The AG accepted Louboutin’s arguments that, at least within the aesthetic field, 
there is no need to keep aesthetic characteristics that give substantial value to the 
goods available on a permanent basis because public preferences may change in line 
with fashion trends.  This “evolutionary interpretation”157 of aesthetic functionality 
acknowledges that “[aesthetic] characteristics do not have a sufficiently long 
economic lifetime to justify [permanent] protection”158 and, where they no longer 
confer a strong competitive advantage upon one trader, a trade dress mark like that 
of Louboutin red sole should not be rejected under this provision.  Consequently, an 
evolutionary interpretation of the EU doctrine of aesthetic functionality offers the 
 
150 Christian Louboutin v. Van Haren Shoenen BV, 2018 E.C.R. I-423 (¶ 17). 
151 Id. (Opinion of AG Szpunar, First Opinion at ¶ 22, and Second Opinion ¶ 11). 
152 Id. (Second Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 50). 
153 Id. (Second Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 52). 
154 Id. (Second Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 50). 
155 Id. (Second Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 51). 
156 Christian Louboutin, 2018 E.C.R. I-423 (Second Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 51). 
157 Eleonora Rosatti, AG Szpunar Confirms That There Is a Way Out of Invalidation for the 
Louboutin Red Sole Trade Mark, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 518, 520 (2018). 
158 Christian Louboutin, 2018 E.C.R. I-423 (Second Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 46) (reporting 
Louboutin’s argument, which was similar to that of the German Government at the hearing.). 
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advantage of permitting registration where the initial aesthetic appeal becomes 
secondary to the source identification subsequently developed by the owner; thus, 
brand reputation becomes the conclusive factor for consumers’ choice of the product, 
not the design itself.159  There is support in academic literature for the AG’s dynamic 
approach to consumer preferences for functionality.  According to its supporters, it 
avoids the perceived harshness of permanently foreclosing the option of trade mark 
protection where consumer demand for the shape is no longer due to its intrinsic 
appeal but its strong reputation as a result of successful branding efforts.160  This 
perceived harshness is also shared in US quarters.161  A common example of these 
harsh consequences is the CJEU’s ruling that the stitch pattern mark widely used by 
G-Star in the marketing of its famous Elwood design trousers still infringed the 
substantial value criterion where the design’s popularity no longer derived from the 
shape itself but was largely attributed to consumers recognizing the shape as a G-
Star product. 162  In Benetton, G-Star sought to prevent competitor Benetton selling 
trousers with similar distinctive stitching but Benetton raised functionality as a 
ground for revocation.  In affirming Remington, the CJEU rejected the suggestion 
that a shape that at first added substantial value to the goods contrary to (ex-
)Art.3(1)(e)(iii) might nevertheless be protected where, prior to the registration, 
consumers’ desire for stitch-patterned jeans came largely from familiarity with the 
shape that G-Star made famous.163  
Some regard Benetton as formally correct but at the same time, as “a policy-blind 
execution of black-letter law.”164  Kur complained that the criterion poses a 
problematic dilemma, namely if a shape is aesthetically appealing but also serves a 
source-related function and consumers purchase the branded product precisely for 
that reason then there is no longer any basis for claiming that its aesthetic 
appearance determines the substantial value of the product.165  She argued that a 
strict application of the criterion leads to flawed results for another reason.  Writing 
presciently prior to Hauck and Louboutin, Kur also identified a distinction between 
the different functionality criteria and stressed that consumer behaviour to buy the 
product under the substantial value criterion entails subjective evaluations that 
“make[] it a moving target–more often than not, such evaluations are bound to 
 
159 Lavinia Brancusi, Trade Marks’ Functionality in EU Law: Expected New Trends After the 
Louboutin Case, 2 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 98,104 (2019). 
160 Annette Kur, Too Pretty to Protect? Trade Mark Law and The Enigma of Aesthetic 
Functionality, (Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop. & Competition L., Research Paper Series No. 11-
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Common, Too Splendid, or “Just Right”? Trade Mark Protection for Product Shapes in the Light of 
the CJEU’s Case-Law?, (Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop. & Competition L., Research Paper Series 
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161 Mark McKenna, (Dis) Functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV 823, 854 (2011) (observing that one of 
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162 Case C-371/06, Benetton Group SpA v. G-Star Int BV, 2007 E.C.R. 542 (the shape marks 
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Functionality, 21 (Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop. & Competition L., Research Paper Series No. 
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165 Id. at 15. 
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change with time.”166  Others also endorse utmost caution and advocate including a 
“time factor” in all functional exclusions, which “may change the status of certain 
product characteristics over the years” as well as consumer expectations.167  For 
other European commentators, however, “aspects such as beauty, prettiness or 
decorative aspects do not relate to functional characteristics of products” and there is 
therefore no compelling need for competitors to use a design like the Elwood jeans.168   
It is beyond the scope of this article to scrutinize these arguments properly but 
suffice to state the following.  Firstly, Hauck rejected a purely subjective consumer-
based assessment of the substantial value exclusion in favor of “fundamentally 
objective facts,” which demonstrate that exclusivity over a product shape to a single 
trader hinders the ability of others to place competing goods and distorts competition 
on the market concerned.169  US courts also conduct a “highly fact-specific” enquiry in 
aesthetic functionality cases, acknowledging that “aesthetic function and branding 
success can sometimes be difficult to distinguish.”170  Secondly, functionality is not 
the opposite of source indication.  US scholars argue that “aesthetic functionality 
cases frequently involve features that have both source-related and non-source-
related significance” and this “dual significance” makes it difficult to know whether 
“the feature is either functional, on the one hand, or has source significance, on the 
other.”171  It is nonetheless possible for product features to have secondary meaning 
and still be “competitively necessary in at least some context.”172  Thirdly, US courts 
have long acknowledged that beauty is a form of function.173  Some scholars thus 
question “the near uniform sense that aesthetic features generally are not 
competitively necessary,”174 and even the most ardent critics of functionality 
acknowledge that “product market competition can be impaired by protecting 
aesthetic trade dress just as much as it can by protecting utilitarian trade dress.”175   
Fourthly, recent US scholarship backs up the AG’s proposal for adjusting the 
analytical framework for aesthetically functional features because of “the subjectivity 
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and heterogeneity of aesthetic preference” among consumers.176  However, this 
scholarship offers a more nuanced view of consumer tastes than that articulated by 
Kur, Brancusi and AG Szpunar.  Justin Hughes argues that US “aesthetic” 
functionality cases are actually about cognitive or psychological responses in 
consumers, not aesthetics per se.177  Such cognitive and psychological consumer 
responses are based “either on evolution or deeply rooted acculturation that may or 
may not be ‘aesthetic.’”178  Courts should thus ask whether the aesthetic appeal of the 
claimed feature arises from pre-existing consumer biases or whether the preference 
arises from activities of the owner.  Positive consumer responses to certain colours 
are usually the result of evolution or acculturation before (and regardless of) any 
branding efforts by the owner.179   The focus on pre-existing aesthetic propensities 
enables Hughes to claim that courts should only find aesthetic functionality “when 
the product feature at issue triggers a positive cognitive, psychological, or aesthetic 
response among a substantial composite of the relevant consumers and that response 
predates the . . . owner’s activities.”180  One (hypothetical) example of a feature that 
was once mechanically functional but became purely stylistic is the Lincoln Mark car 
boot hump.181  Its aesthetic cue for luxury among American drivers is the creation of 
Ford Company’s marketing efforts; this consumer response should not be the basis 
for aesthetic functionality.  Nonetheless, arguments about the potential for 
“technological change” to render ornamental what was once functional are not new.182  
Features triggering pre-existing consumer disposition should remain free for all 
despite the dynamic nature of fashion trends.  Indeed, in the fashion industry, 
“products and consumer taste are cyclical in nature.”183  Some critique the Hauck 
substantial value factors for being temporary in nature (i.e. pricing and marketing 
campaigns) even though the ban is permanent.184  What is strikingly missing in these 
critiques is the need for a more contextualized market-orientated examination that 
considers both industry practices and competitive necessity.  That is, a crucial part of 
aesthetic functionality is played by evidence of whether competition in the specific 
industry is largely driven by visual appeal and the significant impact that protection 
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may have upon the availability of acceptable alternatives.185  That evidence must 
come from claimants, not tribunals.  More importantly, it is highly questionable that 
the CJEU should adopt a permissible approach to the rationale of keeping functional 
signs free for all, especially when word marks, logos and labels remain available to 
distinguish products such as G-Star jeans, Lego toy-bricks, Louboutin shoes, and 
Tripp-Trapp chairs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The EU functionality doctrine remains highly controversial.  It has gone from 
being a rarely used and obscure provision to being the primary tool for preventing 
socially unacceptable monopolies and preserving market freedom.  Despite calls for 
reducing its scope, legislative reforms have endowed functionality with a far greater 
role in enhancing competition.  The EU legislature however failed to articulate the 
policies and normative content that should guide any functionality analysis.  The 
CJEU has been active in providing guidance by second-guessing the legislative intent 
in the light of the Common Market.  Its case-law around functionality is gradually 
becoming more settled but it has yet to offer a more principled approach to some of 
the statutory provisions such as utilitarian and aesthetic functionality.  In its 
pronouncements, however, the Court makes it clear that functionality is a truly 
European doctrine, and is not merely anti-accumulation measure. 
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